This article analyzes the movement of personnel among elite positions in business and government, contrasting the staffing patterns at higher rungs of the executive branch during the Clinton and G. W. Bush administrations. We find that the Bush administration recruited far more heavily from among corporate officers and directors than did the Clinton administration, particularly when staffing ambassadorships. We also find that both administrations served as springboards for subsequent corporate board appointments. There were relatively few patterns with respect to industry or geography, with the exception of the military: All but one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the turn of the millennium ended up serving on the board of a military contractor after completing their government service.
C orporate efforts to influence government can generally be classified into three channels-information, money, and votes (Hillman & Hitt, 1999) . These three modes of exchange imply a sharply drawn line between source and target. On one side of the divide are corporations and other interests, whose strategy incorporates corporate political activity, and on the other are members of government, whose job is to set public policy. Those seeking to influence government have at their disposal a sizable arsenal including lobbying, trade associations, think tanks, political action committees, and other tools with which to impress their points of view upon the minds of key decision makers. This form of influence was brought to the fore by Barley (2007) in his detailed analysis of the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act in the United States.
Yet, another form of possible corporate influence in the political arena does not involve the exchange of tangible or intangible goods but rather the movement of people. Corporate employees can and do fill positions in executive branches of government. Conversely, upon completing their service, many former government officials find employment in the corporate world. Whereas lobbying, campaign contributions, and similar modes of political influence have been thoroughly analyzed by political scientists and economists (e.g., Austen-Smith, 1995; Baye, Kovenock, & de Vries, 1993) , we are unaware of research on the migration of individuals between government and business.
Social critics have linked corporate elite networks to economic control for more than a century. Louis Brandeis wrote in 1914 of the malign influence of bankers holding shared board memberships with industrial firms: "The practice of interlocking directorates is the root of many evils. It offends laws human and divine. . . . It is the most potent instrument of the Money Trust" (p. 51). Subsequent researchers have documented the expansive connections among corporate boards of directors, finding that most pairs of firms in the Fortune 1000 could be linked by fewer than four shared directorships, even after banks had lost their position of centrality (Davis, Yoo, & Baker, 2003) . And midcentury theorists linked business networks explicitly to political power. C. Wright Mills (1956) wrote, "By the power elite, we refer to those political, economic, and military circles which, as an intricate set of overlapping cliques, share decisions having at least national consequences" (p. 18). A few individuals were particularly active in knitting together these distinct circles: "By their very careers and activities, they lace the three types of milieux together. They are, accordingly, the core members of the power elite" (Mills, 1956, p. 289) . Subsequent research documented that well-connected corporate directors were particularly likely to serve on influential public policy organizations (Useem, 1984) , and that corporations whose officers served on the same bank boards engaged in more similar political action (Mizruchi, 1992 ). Yet we are not aware of prior research documenting systematic movement among corporate and government service, or how it might vary over time.
In his 2007 Journal of Management Inquiry article, "Corporations, Democracy, and the Public Good," Barley argues that corporations can undermine the concept of representative democracy through their influence on legislation and regulation and concludes that "It is time for organizational theorists to pay much closer attention to how organizations alter and even create their environments" (Barley, 2007, p. 214) . In this article, we describe an initial attempt to understand one of the underexplored mechanisms by which corporate and government interests become more closely aligned, namely, through personnel transitions between corporations and government organizations in the United States. Specifically, we analyze how the business ties of political appointees in the Clinton and Bush administrations differ in terms of where they came from (before government service) and where they ended up (after government service).
Data and Method
Our research design called for creating networks based on data on organizations and individuals. In our networks, organizations-both governmental and corporate-are represented as nodes. Each network tie between two nodes represents an individual who, at different points in time, was employed by both organizations thus linked. For corporations, we focused on board membership, whereas for government we looked at higher echelon appointments in the executive branch. To be included in the network, at least one of an individual's ties had to connect a governmental organization and a corporation.
Business organizations included in the sample were all U.S.-based corporations traded on NASDAQ and the New York Stock Exchange. Director data for these corporations came from company proxy statements via Compact Disclosure. Government organizations in the sample included all organizations listed under "executive branch" and "executive agencies" in the U.S. Government Manual. The U.S Government Manual, updated and republished annually by the U.S. Government Printing Office, is the official handbook of the federal government and provides contact information for all U.S. government office holders. Examples of government organizations in our sample are the State Department, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Tennessee Valley Authority. Our sample did not include individuals appointed to positions in federal regional or field offices, nor members of the U.S. military below the level of chief of staff, and thus contained about 3,000 records for each year collected.
Based on these data, we created four independent networks, two each for the Clinton administration and for the George W. Bush administration. For each administration, we created one network for individuals moving from the world of business into government and a different network depicting the movement of individuals from government to publicly traded companies (see figure 1 ). For each network, we counted the number of individuals, corporations, and government organizations represented. We also examined the industries represented at the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) two-digit level, as well as geographic dispersion in terms of the state in which a corporate headquarters was located.
Findings
Our aggregated results are described in Table 1 . Two main findings are readily apparent. First, the Bush administration employed a much larger number of corporate directors than did the Clinton administration (73 vs. 16). Second, the number of outgoing Clinton officials later joining corporate boards was markedly higher than the number of incoming directors (45 vs. 16), indicating that government service in the Clinton administration served as a path to corporate power. Similarly, 47 Bush officials in 2002 were corporate directors in 2006, but it is quite likely that this number is considerably right truncated and will grow significantly over the next several years.
Drilling deeper into the data, we examined which government organizations are especially prone to employ corporate directors or are associated with subsequent appointments to corporate boards. These data are presented in the ranks of corporate directors. Personnel from the Department of State are also linked to corporate interests, especially in the incoming Bush network. This appears to reflect the propensity of the Bush administration to appoint high-level fund-raisers to ambassadorships. Of the 20 corporate directors appointed by Bush to the State Department, 16 were posted as ambassadors.
Ten of these 16 (or in one case a husband and in another a brother) were Bush "pioneers" or "rangers"-individuals who gathered $100,000 or $200,000 respectively for the Bush 2000 and 2004 presidential campaigns. In addition, defense-related organizations (the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff) are also prevalent. It is Finally, in examining the influence of industry and geographic location (state of corporate headquarters), we did not uncover striking relationships between these attributes and appointment to government positions. For example, the two states where most outgoing Clinton officials were appointed as directors were New York (10) and Texas (7); for Bush they were Texas (9) and Virginia (8).
Conclusions
Our findings provide evidence that government service can serve as a conduit for joining the ranks of the corporate elite. In addition, we find a marked difference between the Clinton and Bush administrations in terms of the talent pool from which they drew their appointees, with Bush having relied much more heavily on the corporate world for his choice of officials. With the limited data we have available, however, we can only speculate as to whether these differences between the two administrations are idiosyncratic, ideological, or perhaps associated with a broader shift in the balance of power between government and business. Moreover, we believe that the picture we provide is not full, because some personnel transitions are undetectable using our mode of analysis.
Two examples help illustrate this point. First is the Philip A. Cooney episode. Cooney served as chief of staff for the Bush White House Council on Environmental Quality and, without any scientific training, edited climate research studies under his purview, downplaying the robustness of scientific studies on global warming (Revkin, 2005a) . Prior to his appointment to the Council on Environmental Quality, Cooney was a lobbyist at the American Petroleum Institute. Two days after the press reported on Cooney's tampering with reports, he resigned from government and was immediately hired, for an unspecified position, by ExxonMobil (Revkin, 2005b) . Another example is Gale Norton, secretary of the Interior in the years [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . As secretary of the Interior, Norton oversaw the Bureau of Land Management, which is responsible for oil and gas leases on federal lands. After leaving government, Norton joined Royal Dutch Shell as general counsel for the firm's unconventional resources division, which focuses on extraction from shale and heavy oil sources (MarketWatch, 2006).
These two examples were undetected in our study because the persons involved were not appointed to corporate boards, yet they are undoubtedly meaningful indicators of corporate influence in the political arena.
In noting these shortcomings of our study, we conclude that future research should be concerned with expanding the breadth of data analyzed, and also with greater theoretical development, to place findings in an accurate and meaningful context.
